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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K J SCHARF, dba WESTERN 
LEASING, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BMG CORPORATION, VERNON R 
ERICKSON, MICHAEL R. ERICKSON, 
and BRUCE V. ERICKSON, 
Defendants. 
VERNON R. ERICKSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 18963 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to recover a deficiency judgment after 
repossession and sale of two machines that had been leased to 
BMG Corporation under two separate lease agreements, both of which 
had been guaranteed by Vernon R. Erickson, Michael R. Erickson, and 
Bruce V. Erickson 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COllRT 
At the commencement of trial, on plaintiff's motion the ;;1·t1on '""' 
dismissed as against BMG Corporat10n, Bruce V. F.nckson, and 
Michael R. Erickson, and proceeded against Vernon R Erickson before 
Honorable David B. Dee, without a jury. The court entered judgment 
against Vernon R. Erickson for $57, 810 21 plus costs 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment, and the award of an 
attorney's fee for services in connection with the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the first paragraph of appellant's 
"Statement of Material Facts" but does not agree with the remaining 
paragraphs or with the statement as a whole because of the omission of 
much material evidence. 
In paragraph 2, page 2, of his brief, appellant quotes a portion of 
a demand letter from Miss Scharf, dba Western Leasing, which is 
intended to create the impression, and support argument on page 10 of 
the brief, that Miss Scharf had a total lack of concern for the amount 
to be received upon sale of the equipment 
letter (Exhibit 3) gives an opposite impression 
- 2 -
A reading of the entire 
Dear Mr. Erickson. 
With reference to our telephone conversation last week, this 
letter is to inform you that the above leases which you have 
guaranteed are now in default, and we must ask you to bring 
the enclosed statements current. 
As we discussed with you, the machinery is being picked up 
and is bemg advertised for sale. We are willing _1£ wait for 
the best offer we feel we can _1£ sell the equipment; 
however, we have !£ make all Qf the back payments _1£ the 
bank and cannot afford _1£ do so longer. 
Therefore, we must ask you to make substantial reductions of 
the balances due on both leases; this will give us some time 
to look for the highest possible bids for sale Qf the 
equipment. If a payment is not received in our office before 
April 30, 1980, we will be forced to sell the equipment as 
quickly as possible for what ever we can get and ask you to 
make up any deficiencies on the balances of the leases. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The next paragraph of the brief states that after repossession of 
the equipment, Western Leasing "published an advertisement" to sell the 
equipment. The statement is true but bare-boned. The testimony was 
that Western Leasing published advertisements in the Salt Lake 
Tribune, the Deseret News, and the Ogden Standard Examiner, and ran 
them for three weeks in each (R. 114-115). 
(Exhibit 5) read as follows: 
TAKE OVER LEASE PAYMENTS 
OR MAKE OFFER ON 
1) Summit Hydraulic Shear 
2) Victor Lathe 16" by 60" 
3) Model XL Hyd. Iron Worker 
4) Enterprise Model L-2 Lathe 
ALL IN EXCELLENT CONDITION 
Call 295-2412 
- 3 -
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This advertisement appeared in the classlf1ed sect Jon under the 
heading "Machinery . Pipe, Tools " 
Appellant is correct in pointing out that the machinery was in good 
condition at the time of sale, but neglected to mention that some of the 
dies were missing from the shear (R. 121); and two chucks (a 
three-jaw chuck and a four-jaw chuck), a taper attachment, and 
accessories were missing from the lathe ( R. 120, 138) Although 
Miss Scharf testified that the useful life of the equipment would be 
30 years if it were properly cared for and maintained, appellant's 
expert witness testified that the useful life for both the Victor Lathe 
and the Summit Shear was about ten years (R. 195). 
Appellant correctly states that the lathe was purchased new for 
$18, 000 in the summer of 1979; he does not mention that although 
Miss Scharf paid for a 24 x 60-inch lathe, BMG Corporation, by some 
arrangement with the seller, Tan-Dem Machinery, agreed to accept a 
much less expensive 16 x 60-inch lathe, apparently for some 
consideration back from Tan-Dem Machinery (R. 141, 142, 145). 
Appellant correctly points out that a "written appraisal by an 
independent, qualified appraiser" was not obtained by Western Leasing, 
he fails to mention that Miss Scharf had the equipment priced 
independently by two qualifed persons who were familiar with the 
Summit brand shears and Victor brand lathes (R 125-127), and that 
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the appraisal for the shear was $18 ,500 and the appraisal for the lathe 
was $5, 255. The shear was sold for $19 ,000 and the lathe for $6 ,000 
( R 118), which were the highest offers received (R. 119). The 
appellant stresses evidence of its expert witness that the equipment 
"would have a minimum fair market value of at least 80% of the purchase 
price" (R. 193-199), but the testimony of that witness, Peter Robert 
Grisley, was not that clear and was of doubtful validity. He said he 
would value machinery of this type at 80% of its "market value" and 
that would be the lowest that his company would sell it for (R. 199). 
The 80% to which he referred is what his company would buy equipment 
for (R. 203) but his company would not buy a used piece of equipment 
such as the Victor Lathe (R. 204). The witness had had no experience 
in buying or selling Victor Lathes or Summit Shears, had not seen any 
of the equipment before testifying, did not know the selling price of a 
16 x 60-inch Victor Lathe, and had never seen a price list for either it 
or a 24 x 60-inch lathe made by Victor (R. 206-207). 
In all, the appellant has referred almost exclusively to evidence 
that he considers helpful to his case. Set out below are some additional 
facts bearing upon the adequacy of the notice and the commercial 
reasonableness of the sale as presented to the trial judge. 
Miss Scharf made serious attempts 
payment program with the Ericksons (R. 
to work out some type of 
107). 
1980, 
Commencing in May 
She told him she had numerous conversations with appellant. 
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that the sons were going to leave the equipment at T;in-!Jem Mdchrn<·n· 
where the machines would be under powf'r and prospect1vP buyers could 
come in, run the machines, and see how well they performed and the 
kind of condition they were in, also that his sons were going to attempt 
to sell the machines (R. 110). In August she talked to Vernon 
Erickson and his sons about picking up the machinery, moving it to a 
different location, doing the advertising, and disposing of the 
equipment (R. 111) Following this she placed the newspaper ads, she 
distributed flyers; she notified some of the dealers that she had dealt 
with in Salt Lake City, Denver, and Albuquerque that the machinery 
was available for sale; she contacted several of her customers in the 
machine tool industry, sellers of such equipment, to notify them that 
she had equipment for sale. In Salt Lake City she contacted Neway 
Products, Rosskelley Supply, and Utah Machine Tool. Tan-Dem 
Machinery had already been notified. In Denver she contacted F J. 
Leonard Company; and in Albuquerque she contacted an individual, 
Vitus Cranberg (R. 112). She contacted various of her customers and 
remembers interest being shown by Atwood Stamping, Arc 
Manufacturing, R & B Fabrication, Jacobs Machinery, International 
Stamping Company, and Utah Tool and Die. It was her practice in this 
type of situation to con tact each one of her customers ( R. 114-115). 
As a result of the newpaper advertising, she received telephone 
calls from various individuals indicating they would like to look at the 
equipment. She would go with them to look at the equipment or 
- 6 -
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Jrrange ( R. 115) for someone to be there so they could inspect the 
equipment and look at it. Several people inspected the machinery 
without ever making an offer on it. She received some verbal offers 
and some written offers. During normal business hours someone was 
there to show the machinery, and if the potential purchasers wanted to 
come after work or on a weekend, plaintiff would make arrangements to 
meet them so they could see the machinery (R. 116). Machinery of this 
kind is often sold through machinery dealers and through newspaper 
advertising. Frequently, lessors place the machinery with a dealer in 
the area and give him responsibility for selling it (R. 119), but 
plaintiff took an active part in this case because dealers customarily 
charge a 10% commission, and by eliminating the dealer she would be 
able to obtain a higher net return (R. 120). 
Absence of the chucks, taper attachment, and other accessories 
substantially limited plaintiff's ability to sell the lathe. "It was like 
trying to sell a car without wheels." Without a chuck, the machine will 
not produce any parts, and before it could be used the purchaser 
would have to buy a chuck and the attachments. The price received 
was a reasonable one, probably even higher than someone else would 
have received under other circumstances, because the purchaser had 
another machine with the same type of tooling, could use the tooling for 
both machines, and would not have to buy more tooling for the 
BMG lathe (R 121). The price at which the shear was sold 
represented its reasonable value or market value. Smaller machine 
- 7 -
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shops and fabricating- companies are the ones who m s,·hdl'f'o 
experience, were generally most IJkely to be mterested rn huvrng ns<'d 
equipment of the type involved The people who made bids on the 
machinery were for the most part people who would be using the 
machines in their normal course of business; they were not people who 
would be likely to resell the equipment (R. 122) 
She didn't attempt to hold a public auction for the machinery 
because an auctioneer usually charges a high premium which only 
further reduces the arnoun t recoverable for the machine. She notified 
people in the industry to find out if they were interested in buying the 
machine or if they were aware of anyone else interested in buying them 
(R. 134). She talked to several purchasing agents from local 
manufacturing companies and she gave notice of availability in the form 
of flyers as well as by the newspaper advertising. 
The letter of September 11, 1980, was not the only notice given to 
appellant. She also contacted him by telephone ( R. 132). On 
September 30 she called him and told him that Tan-Dern Machinery had 
made the highest bid of $17 ,000 and that she was willing to accept that 
because it appeared to be the highest bid she could obtain. In reply 
appellant said, "Fine." Nothing was done by BMG or any of the 
Ericksons to delay the sale or obtain a higher price for the equipment. 
- 8 -
The tnal judge, after considering all of the evidence, made 
Fmdmgs of Fact and Conclusions of Law, among them the following: 
6. On or about September 11, 1980, plaintiff made 
written demand upon BMG Corporation and the Ericksons for 
full payment of the indebtedness due under the leases. 
Plaintiff also informed them that failure to meet the demand 
would result in the equipment being sold on September 30, 
1980. 
7. Plaintiff promptly advertised the equipment for 
three weeks in the Salt Lake Tribune, the Deseret News, and 
the Ogden Examiner under the classified advertisement 
heading, "Machinery , Pipe and Tools . " In addition, plain tiff 
made several telephone calls to possible purchasers and asked 
the Ericksons to try to find a buyer or lessee. 
8. From these efforts plaintiff received written bids 
from nine potential purchasers, and several other oral bids 
which were not confirmed and none of which were as high as 
the price for which the equipment was sold. 
9. Plaintiff made herself available on a regular basis in 
order to show potential purchasers the equipment. 
10. During this period plain tiff continued to encourage 
the Ericksons to find a buyer or lessee for the equipment. 
Defendants failed to produce even one possible purchaser or 
lessee for the equipment during this time. 
* * * 
13. The prices that plaintiff received from the 
respective sales of the equipment was the reasonable market 
value for the equipment. 
* * * 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff's written demand, dated September 11, 
1980, requiring defendants to make full payment of the 
indebtedness due under the leases or to have the equipment 
sold on September 30, 1980, was sufficient notice as required 
pursuant to § 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated (1980), 
wherein plaintiff was only required to. give 
notification of the time after which any private sale is to be 
made * * *·" 
- 9 -
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2. Plaintiff's sale ,,f thee prope>rty un <Jc-t.,1Je1 l, 1981), 
and October 9, 1980. 1s m<·onse4uPnt1al given th;it the o:de 
was a private sale pursuant to § 70A-9-50•i( :l). Utah (:uJc: 
Annotated (1980) 
3. Plaintiff, as secured party, has met its burden 
under the analysis set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc v. Glaubenskee, 649 P 2d 28 
(Utah 1982), of conducting a- commercially reasonable sale 
pursuant to § 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated ( 1980) 
4. Defendants were not prejudiced by any inadequacies 
of the notice because plaintiff made every reasonable effort to 
conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner and 
there was nothmg defendants could have done or would have 
done to enhance the value of the equipment sold. Plaintiff 
received the market value for the equipment sold. * * * 
On the basis of the findings and conclusions, the court entered 
judgment against Vernon R. Erickson for $54,310.21 plus attorney's fees 
of $3, 500 and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
SALE OF THE EQUIPMENT WAS CONDUCTED IN A 
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER. 
Under the provisions of 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
sales of collateral must be commercially reasonable. The section reads 
as follows: 
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private 
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more 
contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in 
parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but 
every aspect of the disposition including the method. manner. 
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily 
in value or is of a type customarily sold on <i recognized 
- 10 -
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market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any 
public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which 
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made 
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has 
not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying 
his right to notification of sale. * * * The secured party 
may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type 
customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which 
is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations 
he may buy at private sale. 
The term "commercially reasonable" is not defined in the Code, and 
appellant has attempted to impose standards that go far beyond those 
that have been utilized by the courts. He says that the secured party 
must use "every effort" to sell the collateral under "every possible 
advantage of time, place, method and manner in order to obtain the 
highest realization possible." He suggests that an independent written 
appraisal must be obtained and professionals hired; that a seller must 
not let possible buyers know that repossessed property is being sold; 
and that, in this case, the secured party should have waited until 1984 
to sell the equipment in the hope that at a later date, a better price 
might be obtained. 
Appellant even goes so far as to suggest that the examples of 
commercially reasonable sales set out in 70A-9-507(2) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 are the only examples of commercially reasonable sales. 
The section provides· 
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a 
sale at a different time or in a different method from that 
selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to 
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially 
reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the 
- 11 -
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collateral in the 11suC1.l 111dnner in an\' d m,1rk1 1 
therefor <>r if tie siclb at lhe price c'u1-i-ent in m.JrkPt ;it 
the time of h10 sale or if hce has othcerwise S<ilcJ 111 ,-,rnfor-m11 v 
with reasonable commercial praL't1ceo dJTiong dealer-s ill the 
type of property sold he has sold ill a commerc1aUy reasonable 
manner. The principles stated m the two precedillg 
sentences with respect to sales also apply as may be 
appropriate to other types of disposition A disposition which 
has been approved in any JUd1c1al proceeding or by any 
bona fide creditor's committee or representative of creditors 
shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable, 
but this sentence does not indicate that any such approval 
must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any 
disposition not so approved is not commercially reasonable 
Much of appellant's brief is devoted to the argument that a sale is 
not commercially reasonable unless it is sold in one of the ways referred 
to in the foregoing quotation. The official Code comment does not take 
that position. 
In view of the remedies provided the debtor and other 
creditors in subsection ( 1) when a secured party does not 
dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, it is 
of great importance to make clear what types of disposition 
are to be considered commercially reasonable, and in an 
appropriate case to give the secured party means of gettillg. 
by court order or negotiation with a creditor's committee or a 
representative of creditors, approval of a proposed method of 
disposition as a commerically reasonable one. Subsection ( 2) 
states rules to assist in the determination, and provide for 
such advance approval in appropriate situations One 
recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral is for 
the secured party to sell the collateral to or through a 
dealer -- a method which in the long run may realize better 
average returns since the secured party does not usually 
maintain his own facilities for making such sales. Such a 
method of sale, fairly conducted, is recognized as 
commercially reasonable under the second sentence of 
subsection ( 2). However. none of the specific methods of 
disposition set forth in subsection ( 2) 1s to be regarded as 
either required or exclusive, provided only that the 
disposition made or about to be made by the securced party 10 
commercially reasonable. 
- 12 -
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In ouppon ,;f the argument that Western Leasing was obligated to 
u:oe professionals in selling the property, appellant cites Liberty 
National Bank '.l· Acme Tool Division, 540 F.2d 1375 (10 Cir. 1976). 
That case, however, involved a situation in which the secured party, 
Liberty National Bank, had had no experience in selling oil drilling 
rigs, and when it repossessed an oil rig its officers inquired and 
investigated as to the usual manner of making such sales. It was told 
that the ordinary method for selling a drilling rig was to employ an 
auctioneer to move the rig to a convenient location, clean it and paint 
it, notify interested persons, and advertise the sale in trade journals 
and newspapers. The bank didn't do any of those things. The rig 
was neither cleaned, painted nor dismantled. The bank did not move it 
to a convenient site but sold it during a snowstorm at the place where 
it had been. The sale was conducted by one who had never conducted 
an auction of an oil rig or any oil field equipment and lacked experience 
in the oil business. And the court was unfavorably impressed by the 
fact that the bank had inquired as to the recognized methods for selling 
an oil rig, but after weighing the situation made a decision not to follow 
them. The rig was sold for substantially less than what the court 
found to be its value, and the evidence indicated that the bank was 
interested only in getting enough out of the oil rig to pay its 
indebtedness although there were other security holders. 
The appellant complains that the persons asked to make offers on 
the equipment knew that it was a "distress sale." It was not a distress 
- 13 -
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offered The persons with whom Miss Scharf de;ilt mu,1 have known 
that she was looking for the best possible price for the equipment. 
Appellant states, without any support from the record, that "potential 
bidders concluded that a bid less than fair market value would be 
entertained by the lessor," and with similar lack of evidence or 
suggestion at the trial that "common knowledge dictates that one rarely 
makes a bid on equipment being sold in a distress sale which closely 
approximates the equipment's actual fair market value unless the 
bidding is competitive." In the present case the bidding was 
"competitive" in the sense that more than one person was being 
contacted for the showing of interest in purchase of the equipment but 
was not competitive in the sense that it was a public auction. 
At page six of his brief, appellant states that the drafter's 
comments state that a private sale "must" use regular commercial 
channels, and then quotes a comment to the effect that a particular 
feature of the Code was designed to "encourage" disposition by private 
sale through regular commercial channels. 
There are only two types of sales contemplated by the Code, a 
private sale and a public sale. The trial court found and the evidence 
required a finding that the sale in this case was a prl\'ate sale 
Appellant has attempted to put Miss Scharf m an unpossible pusitiun 
If she had not sought offers ("bids") from a large number of possible 
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1•111·•.·h;1S<·rs, the argument would certainly have been made that the 
f,1ilure to do so made the sale commercially unreasonable, but since he 
could not legitimately do that, he takes the position that because a 
number of offers were sought, the private sale was somehow converted 
into a public sale, and therefore the notice of the sale was not proper, 
and the sale was not commercially reasonable because it did not follow 
the format of other public sales, 
In Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc, y_. Glaubensklee, 649 P, 2d 28, 30 
(Utah 1982), the court distinguished between public sales and private 
sales: 
* * * A public sale after default "has traditionally meant 'a 
sale in which the public, upon proper notice, is invited to 
participate and given full opportunity to bid upon a 
competitive basis for the property placed on sale, which is 
sold to the highest bidder,'" * * * The requirement of a 
public invitation is essential for a public sale under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. * * * It is fundamental that a 
public sale presupposes posting public notices or advertising. 
* * * The Restatement of Security § 48 Comment (1941) 
defines a public sale as "one to which the public is invited by 
advertisement to appear and bid at auction for the goods to 
be sold." [Citations omitted.] 
There is no way the sale in this case could be considered to be a 
public sale. 
Appellant also takes the position, without supporting evidence, 
that if there had been competitive bidding, "the price realized would 
have approximated the fair market value of 80% (eighty percent) of the 
purchase price." Although the appellant's expert testified with respect 
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to 80% of market \'alue. he never did define markt"I \·;l[u" , .r tw 11 t" 
the purchase price ot a new piece of equ1prnen t Mor·eover the tnal 
court was not required to accept the testimony of the person presented 
to it as an expert, particularly in light of the reasons given for his 
opinions and the admissions made by him in cross-examination See 
31 Am. Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, § 183, Holly v. 
Federal-American Partners, 29 Utah2d 212, 507 P. 2d 381, 383 (1973) 
Miss Scharf had been in the business of buying and leasing these 
particular types of machines. Approximately 70% of her business was in 
machine tools such as those involved in this case (R. 100). She 
testified that the prices obtained for the machine represented their 
market value, and she also testified as to the appraisals obtained from 
two knowledgeable equipment dealers, which appraisals were slightly 
lower than the prices actually received for the equipment on its sale. 
It has also been suggested by appellant that in order for the sale 
to have been commercially reasonable, Miss Scharf should have delayed 
the sale un ti! the end of the lease, hoping for a better price Placing 
such a burden on a secured party is not reasonable. Lessor must pay 
for the purchased property whether any income is being received from 
it or not, and only lessors with great financial resources would be able 
to continue business while following such a procedure 
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Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron, Inc. , 
7, 427 A. 2d 875 ( 1980), one of the cases cited by the 
appellant, the court took the view that delaying a sale for 15 months 
following repossession made the sale commercially unreasonable, 
observing that "the substantial lapse of time obviously persuaded the 
1978 buyer to make a reduced offer, because of the increased age of. 
the machine, the additional depreciation thereof, for many months, and 
other related factors, which would influence a buyer to lower his bid. 
Unreasonable delay in the sale may produce a violation of § 9-504." 
In summary, the standards set out by the appellant are his own. 
Although appellant has found some language here and there from which 
he takes solace, the cases cited have not applied such standards. 
Weiss v. Northwest Acceptance Corporation, 546 P. 2d 1065 (Ore. 1976), 
with respect to commercial reasonableness, dealt primarily with the 
admissibility of evidence relating to the preparation of the goods for 
sale and of demanding a cash or certified check, holding that evidence 
with respect to these matters was relevant and admissible on the 
question of commercial reasonableness, but the court recognized that 
the determination of what is commercially reasonable is a determination 
left in the first instance to the trier of fact. 
Community Management Association v. Tousely, 32 Colo.App. 33, 
505 p 2d 1314 (1973), dealt with the provisions of § 9-504(3), Uniform 
Commercial Code, dispensing with the requirement of reasonable 
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notification if the cuU;iter:ll is of " tvpe cu't"nL1r!l\' · ... \d "n .1 
recognized market 
The courts have generally have not adopted the standards as 
espoused by Grant Gillmore, quoted on page 5 of appellant's brief, the 
test of commercial reasonableness being somewhat more flexible It has 
been said that a secured party acts in a commercially reasonable manner 
when, in process of disposing of repossessed security, he acts in good 
faith and in accordance with commonly accepted commercial practices 
which afford all parties fair treatment, Wilkerson Motor Co., Inc. 
Johnson, 580 P.2d 505, 509 (Okl 1978); and that the qualifying 
disposition of collateral must be made in a good faith attempt to 
accomplish disposition to the parties' mutual best advantage, Hertz 
Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron, Inc. 37 Conn. Sup. 7, 
427 A. 2d 872 (1980), cited by appellant. 
In the present case Miss Scharf went out of her way to attempt to 
obtain a high price for the equipment. She advertised in newspapers, 
attempted to have appellant and his sons find a buyer; and contacted 
numerous dealers in Salt Lake City, Denver, and Albuquerque and 
several of her customers in the machine tool industry who were sellers 
of such equipment. To obtain a higher net return, she set about 
selling the equipment herself in order to avoid the costs incident tu 
placing the machinery in a dealer's place of ur with an 
auctioneer. She sold the machinery at a higher price than that for 
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"·h1ch it had been appraised by responsible equipment dealers; and she 
.>;ave to appellant reasonable notice of the date after which the property 
would be sold There is no evidence that the Ericksons, or any of 
them. attempted to find a buyer for the machinery or that they could 
have obtained a better price for the machinery. Whether a sale has 
been conducted in a commercially reasonable manner is a question of 
fact, and the fact finder had before him ample of evidence from which 
he could and did find that the sales were conducted in a commercially 
reasonable manner. 
II 
THE LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 11, 1980, CONSTITUTED 
REASONABLE NOTIFICATION TO APPELLANT OF THE DATE 
AFTER WHICH THE PROPERTY WOULD BE SOLD. 
The provisions for notification of a sale by a secured party are set 
out in ?OA-9-504(3) Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
* * * Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline 
speedily in value or is of a rype customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and 
place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time 
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is 
to be made sball be sent by the secured party to the debtor, 
* * * 
On September 11, 1980, Miss Scharf's counsel sent a letter to 
appellant setting out the defaults and making a demand for full payment 
of the indebtedness under the leases. Copies of the letter were sent to 
R Erickson and Bruce V. Erickson, the principals in 
BMG Corporation. The next to the last paragraph of the letter read as 
follows 
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The equipment co,·erPd by the leaoes 1s nuw in tlH· fl"'"'·•,,,1"n 
of Western Leasing :md will be sulJ on Septcoml•e1 .\II. l'.J8iJ, 
unless the amounto due under the lease agreement h,l\, IJeen 
paid If they have been p;JJJ, the leased equipment will IJe 
turned over to you or to BMG Curpor;i t10n, if not, the sale 
proceeds, after deduction of costs and expenses, will be 
applied to the indebtedness and Western Leasing will look to 
you and your co-guarantors for payment of the difference 
The appellant takes the position that because the letter stated that 
the property would be sold on September 30, 1980, instead of that it 
would be sold after September 29, 1980, the notification was so 
defective that it did not comply with the requirements of 70A-9-504(3) 
Any reasonable reading of the letter would certainly suggest to the 
reader that he had only through September 29, 1980, within which to 
do something about finding a suitable buyer or a suitable price for the 
equipment. 
The validity of the notice has to be considered in light of the 
purpose of such a notice. This court discussed the notice requirement 
in FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, 590 P. 2d 803, 807 (Utah 
1979): 
The purpose of the notice requirement is for the protection of 
the debtor, by permitting him to bid at the sale, or to 
arrange for interested parties to bid, and to otherwise assure 
that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner. The danger resulting from not notifyin.g the debtor 
of the sale of secured property is that the property may be 
sold for an amount unreasonably below its market value, 
burdening the debtor with liability for the deficiency 
Ironically, the notice requirement acts to the secured party's 
advantage; if the debtor helps secure a higher sale µrir·e, the 
secured party is benefited, because the prospect of 
recoverying any deficiency is usually dubious 
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I nat>much at> the sale in this case was a private sale, the only 
r1<d1ce required was to let the debtor (and the guarantors) know the 
date after which the property would be sold. In support of his 
argument, appellant cites Liberty National Bank Greiner, 
62 OhioApp. 2d 125, 405 N E. 2d 317 (1978), to the effect that a notice 
sunilar to the one given by Western Leasing was inherently misleading 
and therefore did not constitute proper notice of a private sale. The 
brief quotes the following as the faulty notice to the debtor: 
You are hereby given notice that the property * * * will be 
sold on the tenth day after receipt of this letter at Fremont, 
Ohio, and the minimum price for which the secured party may 
be sold is $4, 000. 00. " 
On this basis, it is argued, the court found that the creditor's 
letter had elem en ts of both notice of public sale and notice of private 
sale. But the appellant failed to quote the whole notice, and what was 
left out was very material to the court's holding: 
Any person may appear at the time and place of sale and bid 
on said property. 
It was that language that led the court to the conclusion that the 
notice was patently ambiguous. It had no problem with the fact that 
the notice stated a specific date on which the sale would be held rather 
than an "after" date The court said: 
A reading of the first quoted portion of the notice would 
indicate that the vehicles were to be sold through a private 
sale The mformat10n therein conveyed, i.e., the date after 
which the property would be sold, would satisfy the notice 
requirements of R.C. 1309.47(C) for a private sale. The last 
line of the notice letter, however, indicates that a public sale 
with competitive bidding would be held. Thus, aside from 
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any other deficienq•. the notice was p;itentlv ;imLu;;u"th " 1., 
what type of sale would be held * * * 
In the present case the notice did what it was supposed to do 
Appellant knew how much time he had within which to find a buyer for 
the equipment, or to make some other arrangments for its disposition 
No time and place of sale was set out to give an indication to him that 
he might be protected because the sale would be a public auction. The 
sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and at any time 
prior to September 30, 1980, he could have taken some steps to see 
that a higher price, if obtainable, would be obtained. 
Appellant's position is not supported by Benton-Lincoln Credit 
Service, Inc. v. Giffin, 48 Ore.App. 559, 617 P.2d 662 (1980), cited in 
his brief. In that case the secured party notified the debtor only that 
it intended to apply for a certificate of title and that immediate action 
might be taken for recovering the indebtedness, including costs of 
repossession and other costs. The letter pointed out what remedies 
were available to the secured party and that the exercise of the rights 
might be avoided by paying the balance due. Nowhere in the letter, 
however, was it stated that the property would be sold. 
The court said: 
The letter sent to plaintiff did not serve the purpose of the 
notice required by ORS 79. 5040(3). He was not informc:d that 
the truck would be sold either at public sale at a given time: 
and place or at private sale. but only that sale wa>o "among 
the remedies reserved to the contract holder," ;rnd that he 
- 22 -
must pay the balance due within ten days to avoid " * * * 
t be exercise of these rights * * * . " The only action of 
which he was notified was the secured party's intention to 
apply for a certificate of title. 
Citizens State Bank '!_. Sparks, 202 Neb. 661, 276 N W. 2d 661 
( 1979), also cited by appellant, does not support his argument. In 
that case the only notice given to the debtor was that the property 
would be repossessed, after which it would sold and the money would 
be applied to the note with the remaining balance, if any, taken to 
small claims court. There was no statement at all as to the time after 
which the sale would be made. 
In Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron, Inc., 
37 Conn. Sup. 7, 427 A. 2d 872, 876, (1980), the notice given did not 
specify whether it was a public or private sale. It did meet all the 
requirements of a public sale notice, but a public sale was not held. 
The court decided the notice was ambiguous, misleading and confusing. 
This is different from our case in that the notice was of a public sale. 
It is arguable, though by no means clear, that when a debtor receives 
notice that the sale is going to be a public sale he may assume that 
competitive bidding will bring the highest price available and see no 
reason to take other steps to protect himself. That is not our case, 
because the notice sent to appellant did not have the requirements for a 
public sale notice Neither time nor place was mentioned, and there 
was no suggestion of receiving bids. In Simmons Machinery Company, 
Inc. y_ M M Brokerage, Inc., 409 So. 2d 743, 16 ABR 138, 33 UCC 
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Rep. 419 (Ala. 1981), also relied upon bv appeJL111t. th'" n<>lll'' did n•>I 
state that the property would be sold 
by the Alabama Supreme Court was that. "after date the dnll will 
be elgible [sic] for resale " The Alabama court reg;irded it as 
"tentative" and more of the nature of a demand for payment In our 
case appellant was told that the would be sold. 
Appellant correctly points out that in Associates Financial Services 
Co. , Inc. DiMarco, 383 A 2d 296 (Del. Superior Ct. 1978), the court 
held that the notice of a private sale was not sufficient to support a 
public sale that actually took place. The notice had specified a private 
sale but the secured party conducted a public sale. In holding that 
the notice was defective, the court said: 
* * * Here the notice specified no place of sale and stated the 
items would be offered for sale "after 5.00 p.m on the [ * * 
* ] day of May, 1975 and day to day thereafter until sold." 
This failed to specify a time of sale. Finally the notice 
specifically referred to private sale. This of necessity had 
the effect of eliminating the possibility of bidding by 
defendant or any bidders whom he might have produced. 
Clearly, an important function of a public sale notice is to 
afford the debtor the opportunity to be present and bid at 
the sale and also to encourage others to be present and bid. 
* * * 
The case also dealt with notices of private sales that were 
conducted. With respect to these the court noted the different 
purposes of the two notices. 
* * * the objective of notice where a private sale is 
contemplated is to afford a reasonable time within which the 
debtor can protect his property by paying off the debt or by 
finding a buyer for the property. 
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::)pillers \1 First National Bank Arenzville, 81 Ill App.3d 199, 
400 N E 2d 1057 ( 1980), cited by appellant, involved two sales, notice 
having been given with respect to only one of the items of equipment. 
The court held that notice had to be given with respect to each sale. 
Stewart \1. Taylor Chevrolet, Inc., 17 UCC Rep. 627 (S. D. Ohio 
1975) the creditor gave notice that collateral was to be sold at a public 
sale and the bankruptcy court held that the notice was invalid where 
the property was not sold at a public sale but was sold at a private 
sale. The notice given in the present case, however, was not notice of 
a public sale since there was no mention of the time or place of the 
sale. The Code does not require the notice to contain a statement that 
the sale will be "public" or "private" if the nature of the sale can be 
determined by the terms of the notice. See All-States Leasing Co. v. 
Ochs, 42 Or.App. 319, 600 P.2d 899, 906 (1979); DeLay First National 
Bank v. Jacobsen Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976). 
III 
ANY INSUFFICIENCY IN THE FORM OF THE NOTICE DID 
NOT RESULT IN INJURY TO THE APPELLANT. 
Assuming the notice was not sufficient to comply with the 
provisions of the UCC, it does not follow that the lessor is foreclosed 
from recovering a deficiency In Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. 
Glaubensklee, 649 p. 2d 28, 29 (Utah 1982), Pioneer Dodge sent notice 
to the debtor that a truck would be sold and that she could make her 
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bid on April 30, 1916, at Pioneer· fJodgP at 11 l111 .1 m 
defended against a deficiency iudgment on the gr"und c1nH>ng otlwrs 
that the notice was not adequate m that the sale of the truck occurned 
at 10.00 a.m. instead of 11.00 a m The court disposed of this 
argument by saying: 
On the facts of this case, defendant cannot claim any benefit 
from the error in the notice of sale Although the auction 
actually commenced at 10 00 on the day specified defendant 
did not appear at 11 00 a m., the time stated in the 
notification. Because defendant took no action -- indeed, did 
not even appear personally -- to protect her interest in the 
sale at the later time stated in the notice to her, she was not 
prejudiced by the error in the designation of the hour of 
sale. 
See, also Zions First National Bank v. Hurst, 570 P. 2d 1031, 1033 
(Utah 1977) 
Vernon Erickson is in much the same position as Marlene 
Glaubensklee. Although he was notified of the day on which the 
property was to be sold, he took no steps to make a bid for the 
property himself, to arrange for other financing, to attempt to re-lease 
the property, or to find a buyer for it. 
Appellant acknowledged receiving the letter of September 11. 1980 
But he didn't do much to protect his interest. He testified that 
After I received the letter I worked with Tan-Dem trymg 
to -- or they worked with Tan-Dem trying to get them to sell 
it. And I didn't do too much any more than that, other than 
I figured when the 30th came, why, I would hear what we 
could do to maybe buy it or work -- get somebody there to 
buy it when the sale was taking place. ( R. 192) 
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In addition to having the notice of September 11 sent to the 
debtors, Miss Scharf called appellant on the telephone. On 
September 30, 1980, she called him by telephone and told him Tan-Dem 
Machinery had made the highest bid of $17, 000 for the shear and that 
she was willing to accept that because that was the highest bid she 
could obtain, whereupon appellant said, "Fine." 
It is of some importance that the sale took place after the lessor, 
Miss Scharf, had for weeks been trying to cooperate with the Ericksons 
in getting someone to purchase the machine or enter into a new lease 
for it, and during all that time they had been unable to accomplish 
anything. Not only was appellant not injured by the failure to receive 
proper notice of the sale, when he was called about, he acquiesced in 
the sale at a price $2 ,000 lower than that for which it was ultimately 
sold. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court after hearing all of the evidence, found that the 
sale was commercially reasonable and that the notice was adequate to 
advise the appellant of the date after which a private sale would be 
made. There was abundant evidence to support the findings, 
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be affirmed 
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ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <J fl, day of June, 1983, I served the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief upon Roy G. Haslam, attorney for 
defendant-appellant, by depositing two copies thereof in the United 
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows. 
Roy G. Haslam, Esq. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
- 28 -
